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Perpetual Injustice: The 20 Year Battle for Reparations in Peru
by Aida Faverio* and Anna Naimark**

M

Introduction

ore than twenty years since the Peruvian government
responded to the threat of terrorism by arresting,
detaining, and torturing its own citizens, falsely
accused as terrorists, many of those who were acquitted or
pardoned have yet to receive moral or economic reparations.1
Despite the acknowledgement of the violations by the state, the
conviction of then-President Alberto Fujimori for human rights
violations, and the determination that victims are due reparations, the failure to provide these reparations, as required by
international law, makes the violations ongoing, creating ripple
effects and perpetuating the suffering of these individuals.

Background
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Between 1980 and 2000, two domestic terrorist groups
plagued Peru: Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) and Movimiento
Revolucionario Túpac Amaru (the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary
Movement, MRTA). The Shining Path was especially powerful
and its leader, Abimael Guzmán, was a communist professor of
philosophy who was inspired by Mao Zedong and the Cultural
Revolution in China. Guzman based the Shining Path’s fighting
style on the strategies Mao employed in China’s “People’s War.”
The core of the strategy was to mobilize agrarian societies to
revolt and then encircle large cities, eventually toppling them.
Using this style, the Senderos (members of the Shining Path)
would expel government forces and create “liberated zones.”
Because Guzmán’s strategy imitated Mao’s, the guerilla war
was fought primarily in the Peruvian countryside and gradually

choked off the big cities, with the main target being Lima,
the capital.2
As the internal conflict strengthened, the state consolidated
its power, and mobilized military forces to begin fighting back.
In the 1990s, then-President Alberto Fujimori carried out an
auto-coup d’état by abolishing the Peruvian Congress with
Decree Law 25418. Decree Law 25418 transferred the legislative
powers to the Executive Branch of the government and also
abolished much of the Constitution.3 Decree Laws 25422,
25423, and 25244 removed all the members of the Tribunal
of Constitutional Guarantees, thirteen judges of the Supreme
Court of Justice, and all the members of the National Council
of Judges and the District Councils of Judges from office.4 On
April 23, 1992, the government removed an additional 120
judges and public prosecutors with Decree Law 25446.5 With
the elimination of these foundations and the balance of power,
Fujimori was able to enact several reforms and apply drastic
punishments to those presumed to be members of designated
terrorist groups—the Shining Path and the MRTA.
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The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), established on July 13, 2001, to investigate human rights violations
attributable to the state, the Shining Path, and the MRTA
between 1980 and 2000, found that as a part of Fujimori’s antiterrorism campaign, unsuspecting and innocent civilians were
arrested and subjected to a variety of torturous acts to obtain
information regarding the terrorist groups without access to due
process through a legitimate court system.
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The campaign to fight terrorism began with arbitrary
detentions of mainly campesinos, or people from rural areas,
on the outskirts of the city. Many civilians were accused of
being terrorists or materially supporting terrorists. Raids on
small villages often ended in deaths and/or violent attacks. The
Colina Group, an extrajudicial “anti-communist death squad”
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carried out the most infamous of these raids—the La Cantuta
massacre and the Barrios Altos massacre—under Fujimori’s
orders. The La Cantuta massacre involved the kidnapping,
disappearance, and assassination of nine students and a professor
from La Cantuta University on July 18, 1992.6 The Barrios
Altos massacre involved the execution of fourteen adults and
an eight-year-old boy in Lima’s Barrios Altos neighborhood on
November 3, 1991. The TRC found that between 1980 and 2000,
more than 69,280 persons were killed or forcibly disappeared.7
This number reflects not only those killed by the government,
but also those killed by the Shining Path and the MRTA. Those
killed in the conflict comprise a greater number of human
losses suffered by Peru than all of
the wars that have occurred in its 182
years of independence. It is also more
than double the combined estimated
totals of those killed in the dirty war
in Argentina (30,000) and during
the dictatorship of General Augusto
Pinochet in Chile (3,000).8

Once imprisoned, the alleged terrorists were subjected to
torture, some over the course of years. Many were held incommunicado, cut off from family, friends, and any semblance of
human contact. The treatment that they received was undisputedly
cruel, inhuman, and degrading.

Inadequate Reparations and the Formation of ARIL
After nearly a decade of international pressure, Peru created
an Ad Hoc Commission on August 17, 1996, pursuant to Decree
Law 26655, to grant judicial pardons to those who had been
unjustly convicted or processed for the crimes of terrorism
or treason.16 President Fujimori, the Ombudsman, and the
Minister of Justice all supported the
Commission.

In its early jurisprudence,
the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights established
that the states’ duty to prevent
future violations of human
rights is essential for fulfilling
the requirements to respect
and ensure the exercise
of fundamental rights as
established in the American
Convention on Human Rights.

Even when judicial processes were
utilized, they were grossly defective.
A commission of international lawyers
charged with evaluating the Peruvian
judiciary during the Fujimori regime
called the judicial system’s treatment of
those charged with treason or terrorism
“seriously flawed and at odds in many
key respects with Peru’s international
legal obligations.”9 An investigation
conducted by the Instituto de Defensa
Legal (Institute of Legal Defense, IDL),
a prominent human rights organization
in Peru, found that the judiciary issued 51,684 warrants for
12,858 people.10 Moreover, because Peru has many common
names, warrants require additional identifiers such as parents’
names, a physical description, and the age of the person,
otherwise they are unlawful.11 In the warrants put forth under
Fujimori, however, 89.1 percent did not include parents’ names,
86.3 percent did not specify physical characteristics, and
79.2 percent did not include the age of the person to be
arrested.12 Despite a lack of credible statistics concerning how
many innocent people the government arrested, the number of
warrants issued and the lack of specific identifiers on these
warrants indicates that there may have been thousands.

In order to adjudicate the pardons,
the Commission would have to receive
a request for a pardon and then would
gather information and evidence
regarding the cases, and then evaluate
the cases. If the cases qualified, the
Commission would then send the
requests to the President to grant the
pardon. According to the IDL, Fujimori
pardoned 515 persons falsely convicted
of terrorism and treason.17

Despite government efforts to
address the imprisonment of innocent
civilians, many of the affected individuals did not ultimately receive or benefit
from the pardons. Others who were
unjustly incarcerated or accused were
then either acquitted or never officially
convicted of either terrorism or treason. Both those whom
Fujimori pardoned and those whom the courts acquitted continue
to have the charges or convictions on their permanent criminal
records. Because these are incomplete pardons and acquittals, the individuals’ tainted records make them second-class
citizens. The records label them “terrorists,” which generates
severe stigmatization and prevents them from obtaining employment or accessing educational opportunities.
After years of being subjected to arbitrary detentions, torture,
and violations of due process, and advocating for their right to
reparations, some 300 pardoned and acquitted Peruvians came
together to form the Asociación Reflexión de Inocentes Liberados
(Reflection Association of Liberated Innocents, ARIL).

Many of those who were arrested were not given a trial.
Those who were given a hearing had to go before a “faceless
tribunal” where the judges would not show their faces, would
distort their voices, and would not sign the judgments, allegedly
out of fear of revenge by the terrorists. This made it impossible
to know whether the judges had proper legal training, much less
if they were providing a fair trial. Moreover, the accused were
given limited legal representation and the evidence needed to
convict and sentence the accused was minimal and was often
falsified or uncorroborated.13 Despite the revocation of the
“faceless judge” provision in October 1997,14 Human Rights
Watch reported that thousands were incarcerated as a result of
this measure and that, in some jurisdictions, up to forty percent
of the convicted were later found innocent.15

Unlike other groups of freed individuals, this group comprises both those who have been pardoned as well as those who
have been acquitted. To them, the fight is one united effort.
he

Struggle for Justice

In its early jurisprudence, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights
(IACtHR, Court) established that the states’
T
duty to prevent future violations of human rights is essential for
fulfilling the requirements to respect and ensure the exercise of
fundamental rights as established in the American Convention
on Human Rights.18 The reparation judgments are the main tool
33
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compensation. In order to gain access to reparations, the
indultados, or pardoned, must file for them in domestic court.
The ARIL members complied with this process but were
denied access to reparations when judges dismissed their
claims because they could not afford to pay the necessary fees.
They were incapable of doing so because they live in poverty
as result of the violations they suffered. In essence, one of the
reasons they need the reparations, for economic stability, is the
same reason that they are denied it. The courts do theoretically
provide fee waivers, but they
have denied ARIL’s requests for
them. The ARIL members’ lack of
resources has thus been an impassible hurdle. Ultimately, the state is
not living up to obligations under
its “duty to repair” because ARIL
members do not have an effective
route to obtain these reparations,
which is a fundamental tenet of the
state’s duty.29

that the Court has to compel Member States to comply with this
duty.19 In consistent jurisprudence, the IACtHR has established
that it is a principle of international law that “any violation of
an international obligation resulting in damage gives rise to
the new obligation to remedy [that] damage.”20 The state must
give the survivors of atrocities remedies that are “in accordance
with the rules of due process of law” and are both adequate and
effective.21 In order to be considered adequate, the domestic
remedies must address the infringement of the legal right. To
be effective, the remedy must be
capable of producing the intended
result.22 The responsible state cannot
invoke provisions of domestic law
to modify or fail to comply with the
obligation to provide reparations,
because all aspects are regulated by
international law.” 23

Ultimately, the state is not living
up to obligations under its “duty
to repair” because ARIL members
do not have an effective route to
obtain … reparations, which is a
fundamental tenet of the state’s duty.

The Constitutional Court of
Peru, using guidance from the jurisprudence of the Inter-American
System of Human Rights (IASHR),
affirmed the right to a remedy from
a competent court in the face of any act or omission that harms
fundamental rights.24 This right was elaborated in VelásquezRodríguez v. Honduras, when the Court became the first human
rights tribunal to require a state to “prevent, investigate and
punish any violation of the rights . . . [and] attempt to restore
the right violated and provide compensation as warranted for
damages resulting from the violation.”25 These remedies, known
collectively as reparations, refer to the economic and moral
reparations, which the violating state is responsible for providing
to the victims under the American Convention. Economic
reparations are money rewards for actual damages or pecuniary
rewards.26 Moral reparations are designed as restitution for
damages that cannot be quantified and are public acts or works
that aim to restore dignity to the victims and their families
and publicly condemn the human rights violations in question
to prevent their recurrence.27

Far from being “repaired” to the
state of their lives before they were
swept up in the conflict, even the one reparation some members
of ARIL were given has caused them to struggle. The government gave pardoned members of ARIL a desolate plot of land in
Huachipa, about an hour outside of the capital city and situated
in the middle of three factories, as a reparation, but the grant
was realistically a tool used by the state to get the group to cease
its requests for further redress. The members of ARIL call this a
“self-reparation” because, after they were granted the land, they
had to fight to use it. First, ARIL members had to fight military
officials in charge of the munitions factory that borders the plot
for rights to the land. Then, after they won a smaller piece of
the land from what the original reparation granted, they were
told they could not build on it until there were environmental
tests that showed the land was safe to live on. ARIL members
then conducted the necessary environmental tests at their own
expense. After they were finally approved to build on the land,
they had to finance the infrastructure on the arid plot. The
land at Huachipa has a nonfunctional sewage system, no water
supply, and the homes are not structurally secure. The greatest
irony of their “self-reparation,” members note, is that they must
live as neighbors with the military, the same institution that
Fujimori used to torture them and deny them of their basic
human rights for years.30

In order to fulfill these obligations, the Peruvian government
enacted Decree Law 28952, which created the Integral Plan of
Reparations (Plan Integral de Reparaciones, PIR), to give those
who have been pardoned adequate reparations.28 However, the
plan excluded those who were acquitted before being convicted,
despite having suffered similar violations to those who were
pardoned. Under the PIR, acquitted individuals do not qualify
for monetary compensation because it is assumed
that they did not suffer the same prison conditions or loss of livelihood as those who served
prison terms. The state failed to give even those
who qualified for the reparations as pardoned
individuals their reparations, claiming that it
lacked funding.
For years, the members of ARIL have been
struggling to have their voices heard within
the judicial system. Despite the democratization
of the government and the international legal
right to reparation they have in theory, in practice, members of ARIL have not received any
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The years of detention the members of ARIL suffered involving
cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment by the Peruvian
government have ended, but the violation of their human rights
has not. They remain stigmatized by the state’s false accusations
of terrorism and treason. Moreover, because of their history of
oppression by the state, they cannot afford to gain access to
the reparations they are due under the law. Unable to seek help
domestically, ARIL looked to the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (IACHR) almost nine years ago and has yet to
reach even the admissibility stage. The eight petitions they filed
languish, and the justice they deserve is on hold as the IACHR
tries to process 8,500 other pending cases.31

Conclusion
The members of ARIL have suffered a clear violation of
international law by Peru. The IASHR has affirmed that where a
country violates the rights of its citizens, those citizens are due
adequate and effective reparations. The IASHR, as well as the
government of Peru, has affirmed the violations and, therefore,
Peru incurred this obligation to properly redress it. In order to
do this, the state should give the members of ARIL reparations
that will put them back to the position they were in before they
were wrongfully accused of treason and terrorism, arbitrarily
detained, and subjected to cruel and inhuman treatment. The
IACtHR clarified the duty to provide restitution as a requirement
of customary international law in numerous cases, including the
Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru case.32 This requires both
payments of economic reparations for years of life taken away
from them, pain and suffering, and lost economic opportunities,
as well as moral reparations that counter stigmatization with
moral reparations to publically acknowledge the members of
ARIL’s innocence. There is no way to completely repair the life
of someone who has suffered so greatly at the hands of a state
actor, but Peru has not even come close to fulfilling their obligations to attempt an adequate reparation.
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The members of ARIL not only suffer from memories of the
past but also continue to suffer from the ongoing stigmatization
of being branded as terrorists. Despite the fact that they have
been pardoned or acquitted and were never involved in acts of
terrorism, being associated with the Senderos and the MRTA
haunts their daily lives. Marred with criminal records, these
individuals have trouble accessing employment. Some of the
members were isolated from their families after being labeled
as terrorists and have had trouble reestablishing a sense of community. The members’ names appear published as “terrorists”
in newspapers, leading to threats and personal insecurity. They
face this social and economic isolation in addition to the many
ailments that result from being subjected to torture. Many of
the individuals live with post-traumatic stress disorders and
physical ailments from the many years of torture they endured.
They suffered a loss of livelihood, family life, security, economic
opportunities, homes, crops, businesses, community involvement, and virtually everything a person values and needs for
basic adequate subsistence. They suffer this because they were
mistaken as terrorists, something the Peruvian government
recognized its responsibility for, yet has failed to redress.
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